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COMMENTS
THE PLIGHT OF THE TAXPAYER WITH A
NONBUSINESS BAD DEBT
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of the taxpayer holding a bad debt is to
claim it as a deduction against ordinary income. In addition to secur-
ing a full deduction the taxpayer is concerned also with the timing of
the deduction, so that it may be claimed in the proper year. With some
minor exceptions, it would appear that under the present Internal
Revenue Code the avenues of approach to an ordinary deduction have
been blocked and the taxpayer's objective rendered incapable of at-
tainment.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 19421 there was no distinction made
in the code between business and nonbusiness bad debts. Both business
and nonbusiness debts were deductible in full against ordinary income
except that a special rule applied to security losses.2 By the 1942
amendment3 a drastic change was effected. Thereafter, the loss result-
ing from a totally worthless nonbusiness debt was to be treated as a
loss resulting from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a
capital asset held for not more than six months.
It would appear that arguments of inequitable treatment could be
advanced against such a result in view of the fact that any income
realized on the very same debt would be taxed as ordinary income.'
However, the holdings that deductions are matters of legislative grace,5
and the Ways and Means Committee Report6 on the 1942 amendment
provide ample rejoinder.
156 Stat. 798 (1942).21nt. Rev. Code of 1939.
"SEc. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INcOME.
(k) Bad Debts
(1) General rule.-Debts ascertained to be worthless and charged off within
the taxable year (or, in the discretion of the Commissioner, a reasonable
addition to a reserve for bad debts); and when satisfied that a debt is re-
coverable only in part, the Commissioner may allow such debt, in an amount
not in excess of the part charged off within the taxable year, as a deduction.
This paragraph shall not apply in the case of a taxpayer, other than a bank,
as defined in section 104, with respect to a debt evidenced by a security as
defined in paragraph (3) of this subsection."
3 Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 820, §124(a).
4 nt. Rev. Code of 1954.
"SEC. 61. GROSS INCOME DEFINED.
(a) General Deflnition.-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but
not limited to) the following items:
(4) Interest ;"
(Subsequent code section citations refer to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, un-
less otherwise noted.)
5 Meltzer v. Comm., 154 F. 2d 776 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 723
(1946).
6 Report-NWXrays and Means Committee (77th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rept. 2333),
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Under the presently applicable code section,7 the loss resulting from
a worthless nonbusiness debt must be treated as a short-term capital
loss and, of course, is subject to the restrictions imposed on that type
of loss.8
1942-2 Cum. Bull. 408.
"The present law gives the same tax treatment to bad debts incurred in
nonbusiness transactions as it allows to business bad debts. An example of a
nonbusiness bad debt would be an unrepaid loan to a friend or relative,
while business bad debts arise in the course of the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness. This liberal allowance for nonbusiness bad debts has suffered con-
siderable abuse through taxpayers making loans which they do not expect
to be repaid. This practice is particularly prevalent in the case of loans to
persons with respect to whom the taxpayer is not entitled to a credit for
dependents. This situation has presented serious administrative difficulties be-
cause of the requirement of proof.
"The provisions of section 23(k) (1), as amended by this section, Revenue
Act of 1942, sec. 124(a), with respect to a debt which has become partially
worthless, do not apply in the case of a nonbusiness debt; and a loss with
respect to such a debt will be treated as sustained only if and when the debt
has become totally worthless."7 
"SEC. 166. BAD DEBTs.
(d) Nonbusiness Debts.
(1) General Rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt;
and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within tfie taxable
year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or
exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than
6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness Debt Defined.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
'nonbusiness' means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with
a trade or business of the taxpayer; or(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business."8 
"SEC. 1211. LIMITATIONS ON CAPITAL LossEs.
(b) Other Taxpayers.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation,
losses from the sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to
the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus the taxable income
of the taxpayer or $1,000, whichever is smaller. For purposes of this sub-
section, taxable income shall be computed without regard to gains or losses
from sales or exchanegs of capital assets and without regard to the deductions
provided in section 151 (relating to personal exemptions) or any deduction in
lieu thereof. If the taxpayer elects to pay the optional tax imposed by section
3, 'taxable income' as used in this subsection shall be read as 'adjusted gross
income'."
"SEc. 1212. CAPITAL Loss CARRYOVER.
If for any taxable year the taxpayer has a net capital loss, the amount
thereof shall be a short-term capital loss in each of the 5 succeeding taxable
years to the extent that such amount exceeds the total of any net capital
gains of any taxable years intervening between the taxable year in which
the net capital loss arose and such succeeding taxable year. For purposes of
this section, a net capital gain shall be computed without regard to such net
capital loss or to any net capital losses arising in any such intervening taxable
years, and a net capital loss for a taxable year beginning before October 20,
1951, shall be determined under the applicable law relating to the computation
of capital gains and losses in effect before such date."
Bad debts arising from certain securities are specifically excepted from
section 166 by subsection (e) thereof, and are treated as losses arising from
the sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset.
Thus, a long-term capital loss is possible if the security has been held the
prescribed length of time. A security is defined as (A) a share of stock in
a corporation; (B) a right to subscribe for, or to receive, a share of stock
in a corporation; or (C) a bond, debenture, note or certificate, or other evi-
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WHOLLY WORTHLESS DEBT
As noted above, the code makes express provision for a loss result-
ing from a wholly worthless nonbusiness debt. To obtain the limited
relief allowed for this loss it would appear incumbent upon the taxpayer
to prove (1) the existence of the debt and (2) the fact of worthless-
ness. Either of these elements can be troublesome depending on the
facts of the particular case.
Obviously, a taxpayer cannot take a deduction for a worthless debt
unless there is a valid debt arising out of an actual debtor-creditor
relationship.' The underlying principle is that no valid debt exists un-
less there is an unconditional obligation of another to pay the tax-
payer.10 It is the sine qua non of the existence of the debt and accord-
ingly of the right to deduct worthless debts.1 '
Even if a valid unconditional debt is created, a bad debt deduction
will be denied where the money was advanced with no reasonable
belief at the time that it would be repaid." It is not necessary, how-
ever, that there be an unqualified expectation of repayment. 13 Loans
to relatives and close friends would seem to be an area in which the
burden of proof of these factors would be an extremely difficult one to
sustain. 14 This burden of proof is also difficult in cases of shareholder
loans to corporations which are susceptible to being interpreted as con-
tributions to capital.' 5
dence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation or by a government or political
subdivision thereof, with interest coupons or in registered form.
9 George J. Schaefer, 24 T.C. 638 (1955); Est. of Alexander J. Tutiendgy,
58,057 P-H Memo TC.
L0 Bercaw v. Comm., 165 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948) and William Francis Mercil,
24 T.C. 1150 (1955) (advancements by father to son to finance college
and medical education; held, under these facts, not to be indebtedness
within meaning of the code).
11 Allen-Bradley Co. v. Comm., 112 F. 2d 335 (7th Cir. 1940).
12 W. F. Young, Inc. v. Comm., 120 F. 2d 159 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Clark v. Comm.,
205 F. 2d 353 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Woodward v. United States, 208 F. 2d 893 (8th
Cir. 1953); United States v. Herbert W. Virgin, Jr., 230 F. 2d 880 (5th Cir.
1956), and Harry K. Oliphint, 24 T.C. 744 (1955) (evidence of advances to cor-
poration operating a ranch and which greatly benefited taxpayer's sister left
strong inference inconsistent with the existence of a worthless debt for tax
purposes and failed to overcome presumption of correctness attached to com-
missioner's determination.)
13 Richard M. Drachman, 23 T.C. 558 (1954).
14 See Committee Report, supra note 6.
15 American Cigar Co. v. Comm., 66 F. 2d 425 (2d Cir. 1933) ; cert. denied, 290
U.S. 699 (1933) ; Lewis L. Culley, 29 T.C. 1076 (1958) ; Hoguet Real Estate
Corporation, 30 T.C. 580 (1958, and Estate of Olson; U.S. Treasury Dept. v.
LaCrosse Trust Co., 271 Wis. 199, 72 N.W. 2d 717 (1955). For examples
of advances classified as gifts see Fred A. Bihlmaier, 17 T.C. 620 (1951)
and Frederick C. Moser, f59,025 P-H Memo TC. In the area of tax
planning, for what not to do as regards bad debts see Byerlyte Corporation
v. Williams, 170 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Ohio, 1958) (advancements made
by corporate taxpayer to its wholly-owned subsidiary were not deductible
as bad debts, for income and excess profits tax purposes, but were contribu-
tions to capital, so that no deductions by taxpayer were permitted, where
there was no fixed maturity date for payment of the advances; no
notes evidencing advancements; no agreement was made for payment of
[Vol. 44
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A taxpayer claiming a bad debt deduction must prove that worth-
lessness occurred during the taxable year for which the deduction is
claimed.1 6 Where the taxpayer can point to a clearly identifiable event
causing worthlessness, no serious problem arises. However, many
debts become worthless gradually and it is often extremely difficult to
prove that worthlessness occurred during a particular year. For that
reason, a special seven-year period of limitations applies to refund
claims relating to bad debts and worthless securities.' 7
PARTIALLY WORTHLESS DEBT
The regulations clearly indicate that there is no allowable deduction
for a nonbusiness debt which is recoverable in part during the taxable
year.18 Is there any possibility of relief for a taxpayer in this situation?
The cases of Maurice Levy 9 and Ralph Perkints suggest a method
of obtaining, at least, the limited capital loss deduction.
The taxpayer, Maurice Levy, was engaged in the business of import-
ing and manufacturing perfumery and toilet articles in New York
City. In 1926 he organized a Canadian corporation to conduct a busi-
ness in Montreal, Canada, similar to that conducted by him in the
United States. At the time of organization, Levy advanced cash to it
and sold it merchandise, and continued to do so from time to time there-
after. The amount representing the advance and sales was carried on
the taxpayer's books as an account receivable. Thereafter, taxpayer
sold all of his stock in the corporation and also sold his claim against
the corporation to the purchaser for less than the face value of the debt.
The debt was charged off on taxpayer's books and in his return at the
end of the taxable year an ordinary deduction was claimed in the
amount of the difference between the face value of the debt and what
he received on its sale. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency hold-
ing that the transaction involved the sale of a capital asset and was
limited by the provisions of the capital loss section.
In sustaining the assessment made by the Commissioner, the Board
interest; advances were treated by taxpayer as deferred assets; no outsider
would have loaned money to the subsidiary, and no attempt was made by
taxpayer to enforce collection of advances.)
16 §166 (d).
17 §6511 (d).
18 Treas. Reg. §1.166-5 Nonbusiness bad debts-
"(a) Allowance of deduction as a capital loss.(2) If, in the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, a nonbusiness
debt becomes wholly worthless within the taxable year, the loss resulting
therefrom shall be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, during the
taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months. Such loss
is subject to the limitations on capital losses, and section 1212 relating to
the capital loss carryover, and in the regulations under these sections. A
loss on a nonbusiness debt shall be treated as sustained only if and when the
debt has become totally worthless, and no deduction shall be allowed for a
nonbusiness debt which is recoverable in part during the taxable year."
1946 B.T.A. 423 (1942), aff'd, 131 F. 2d 544 (2d Cir. 1942).
2041 B.T.A. 1225 (1940), afg'd, 125 F. 2d 150 (6th Cir. 1942).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
of Tax Appeals stated that there was no doubt that the claim was par-
tially worthless. But in fact the debt was sold and at the time the
charge-off was made the taxpayer was not the owner of the obligation.
The case was squarely within the provisions of the loss section,2 1 and
being a capital asset was so limited.
The Ralph Perkins case involved a different type of debt. Here,
the taxpayer had deposits in two closed or liquiding banks of $2,317.24
and $296.18, which, at the beginning of the taxable year, had been held
some three and five years, respectively. During the year, the larger
claim was sold for $407.90 and the smaller claim for $2.96. In tax-
payers' return the aggregate loss incurred, $2,202.56, was claimed as a
bad debt. The Commissioner held the loss to be a capital loss and
limited as such. The opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals, affirming
the Commissioner, states:
Debts partially or totally worthless may, of course, be written
off, Revenue Act of 1936, §23(k). But there seems little doubt
that in the alternative they may be sold or exchanged .... There
is no reason to assume that a chose in action such as a bank de-
posit may not be disposed of by sale in the same manner as any
other debt, and the evidence is clear that that is in fact what
was done with the claims in this proceeding. Debts must be
considered property, see Twin Ports Bridge Co., 27 B.T.A. 346,
355, and these obligations do not fall within any of the excep-
tions to the definition of capital assets contained in section 117.
It seems to us to follow that petitioner is limited by the capital
loss provisions. It is, in fact, only the sale that entitles her to
take a deduction for any loss whatever, for no other evidence
of the uncollectibility of the indebtedness has been produced.2
It is true that these cases arose prior to the 1942 amendment23 and
that the taxpayers were seeking full deductions under the bad debt
section. Nevertheless, the method they indicate for obtaining a deduc-
tion can be utilized under the 1954 Code. 24 Where a debt is represented
21 Revenue Act of 1936, §117.
2241 B.T.A. at 1231.
23 Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 820, §124 (a).
24 See Von Hoffmann Corporation, 157,127 P-H Memo TC. (Taxpayer sold all
of the outstanding stock of a corporation to one Smith. The corporation was
indebted to taxpayer in the amount of $65,000. Later taxpayer assigned the
$65,000. note to Smith for $500. and on the same day charged off $64,500. as
a bad debt. Held: Taxpayer entitled only to a capital loss deduction. Sale of
the note to a third person for less than face held not to result in bad debt
deduction where transaction was sale of a capital asset. Taxpayer as sole
corporation stock holder held demand note from the corporation. Sale was
negotiated prior to the time the debt was charged off. As such, it was sale of
a capital asset, since, in effect, a debt was charged off when no longer owned.)
Accord A. T. Mathews, 55,330 P-H Memo T.C. (Taxpayer held the note
of Anchor Fixture Co. in the face amount of $62,500. On Oct. 16, 1950, the
company was insolvent and the note was sold to a third party for $25,000.
Taxpayer contended that he was engaged in the business of lending money
and that the loss was deductible in full as a business loss. Facts showed he
was president and manager of a hotel corporation. Commissioner determied
[Vol. 44
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by a chose in action, the taxpayer can obtain a deduction for a partially
worthless nonbusiness debt through a sale. In such case the deduction
is, of course, classified as a loss, 5 rather than a bad debt, and is sub-
ject to the limitation on capital losses.2 6
While it is true that this legal method is available to the taxpayer
to diminish the amount of his tax liability, in every instance he must
prove that the required test for the allowance of a loss deduction has
been met. A sale of the debt may be legal and complete and result in a
transfer of ownership but it may still not justify the allowance of a
loss deduction.
If a loss is to be deductible, it must be established by a bona fide
transaction whether of sale or otherwise.27 Realities will control and
the event in connection with which the loss was incurred must not be
that taxpayer had sustained a long-term capital loss or in the alternative
a nonbusiness bad debt. Held: Long-term capital loss. Court held it was
unnecessary to decide whether petitioner was engaged in the business of
making loans. Even assuming he was, the record clearly indicated that the
note evidencing such loan was sold, and that the note was a capital asset.
Taxpayer elected to sell the note rather than exercise his legal rights as a
creditor.); Eugene Reynal, 55,078 P-H Memo TC. (Petitioner was organizer
and officer of a publishing company to which he had advanced sums re-
ceiving interest bearing notes issued by the company. Subsequently, all of
the stock in the company and the notes in question were sold to a large
publisher. At the time of this transaction the stock was worthless and the
notes, face value $145,000., were worth $85,000. Petitioner argued that the loss
was deductible as a business bad debt. Held: Capital loss. Even in the event
that he had shown that he was engaged in a business of his own to which
the indebtedness was proximately related, the argument could not be sustained.
On the record presented, the sale of the notes was the first and only event
during the taxable year which gave rise to a recognizable loss.) ; Estate of
Lawrence Harrison, 153,069 P-H Memo TC. (Taxpayer, who had advanced
sums totalling $23,000. to a corporation, was financially over-extended, but
the corporation was not in a position to repay the loan. However, the corpora-
tion was not insolvent and it was not shown that the debt was worthless in
whole or in part. The claim was transferred to a third party for $18,000.
Although a promoter of numerous enterprises, taxpayer was not in the busi-
ness of buying and selling accounts and loans receivable. Held: Capital loss.
The debtor corporation was not insolvent and the debt was not shown to be
worthless to the extent of $5000. The taxpayer being a stockholder of the
debtor apparently did not see fit to exercise fully his legal rights as creditor.
Therefore, he had not met the requirement for a deduction under the bad
debt section.); The Pancoast Hotel Company, 40,503 P-H Memo BTA.(Petitioner held a certificate of deposit issued by the liquidator of the Trust
Company of Florida, in the amount of $9,486.52. This was sold for $5,691.01
and the difference was claimed in full as a loss. Held: Case controlled by
case of Ralph Perkins, 41 B.T.A. 1225. No basis for distinguishing the facts.
The fact that the certificate had been sold was stipulated.)
25 "SEc. 165. LossEs.
(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals.-In the case of an individual, the
deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though
not connected with a trade or business:
(f) Capital Losses.-Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall
be allowed only to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212."26 §§1211 and 1212.2 7Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
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unreal or a sham.2 8 In this connection it is also important to note that
the requirement that a transaction be entered into for profit 8 includes
the taxpayer's entire relation to the subject matter of the sale, including
the acquisition thereof, and not merely the sale."
Investigation of many factors is required in making a determination
that the sale is bona fide or merely a sham, a pretense, unreal or lack-
ing substance. The factors include, for example, the relationship of
the taxpayer to the other party to the transaction, the terms and form
of payment, the character of the interest or title conveyed and the right
retained, if any, to recover the property.
It appears that the most successful basis relied on by the Commis-
sioner in challenging transactions resulting in alleged losses has been
the charge that the person to whom the sale was made bears such a close
relationship to the vendor as to justify the conclusion that no real loss
was sustained. Reference is again made to the 1942 Committee Report
cited previously.3 1 Deductions for losses sustained in transactions be-
tween certain related taxpayers are specifically denied under section
267. 2 Even where the required degree of relationship to bring the
transaction within the code section does not exist, a sale made to a
related taxpayer is likely to be subjected to close scrutiny. The tax-
payer would be well advised if he refrained from sales to controlled
or sympathetic vendees where the transfer might permit the allegation
that the taxpayer was manipulating his property in an attempt to es-
tablish a deductible loss.
POSSIBLE ADVANTAGE INVOLVED IN SALE OF DEBT
It may be more advantageous where a sale of the debt is made,
depending on the particular circumstances of the taxpayer, since the
deduction can be timed by making the sale in the desired taxable year.
This advantage of a sale is well illustrated in Helvering v. Ames. 33
In 1927 the taxpayer, Ames, sold for $500.00 one-half ($221,788.33)
28 Treas. Reg. §1.165-1.
"(b) Nature of loss allowable.-To be allowable as a deduction under
section 165(a), a loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions,
fixed by identifiable events, and actually sustained during the taxable year.
Only a bona fide loss is allowable. Substance and not mere form shall
govern in determining a deductible loss."
29§165(c) (2).3 0 Terry v. U.S., 10 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn. 1934).
S1 See note 6.
32 "SeC. 267. LOSSES, EXPENSES, AND INTEREST WITH RESPECT TO TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN RELATED TAXPAYERS.
(a) Deduction Disallowed.-No deduction shall be allowed-(1) Losses.-In respect of losses from sales or exchanges of property
(other than losses in cases of distributions in corporate liquidations), directly
or indirectly, between persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of
subsection (b).(b) Relationships.-The persons referred to in subsection (a) are:(1) Members of a family, as defined in subsection (c) (4) ;.
33 71 F. 2d 939 (8th Cir. 1934), aff'g 27 B.T.A. 624 (1933).
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of an indebtedness and claimed a loss of $221,288.33 on his 1927 return
which the Commissioner allowed. In 1928 he sold the remaining one-
half of the indebtedness for $100.00 and deducted a loss of $221,688.33
in his 1928 return. The Commissioner disallowed the 1928 deduction
on the ground that the entire indebtedness became worthless in 1927,
relying on the fact that the sale of one-half of the debt for $500.00 in
1927 conclusively showed such worthlessness in 1928. In sustaining
the determination of the Board of Tax Appeals that the disallowance
of the deduction was erroneous, the Court of Appeals indicated that
under the facts the sale was not solely to be attributed to such cause:
Mr. Ames had made large capital gains on his investments
in 1927 and 1928. Offsetting these gains by a bona fide sale of
his indebtedness was not forbidden by law. Even though the
transaction is a device to avoid the burden of taxation, it is not
for that reason alone illegal .... He may have preferred the
certainty of a present sale of a claim doubtful in the time of pay-
ment, if not in the ultimate amount of the amount to be collected,
carrying with it the certainty of an offset to his capital gains and
a minimization of income tax for 1927.3'
Important to the decision, of course, is the fact that the genuiness
of both sales was not questioned.
SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR
While the courts are thus willing to make the transition from a
bad debt to a loss where there is a sale of the obligation to a third
party, they have not seen fit to do so where the taxpayer elects to make
a settlement with the debtor himself.35 Assuming that a valid debt
exists and there has been a bona fide settlement, under the doctrine of
mutual exclusiveness set forth in Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commis-
sioner,36 the loss attributable to the partial worthlessness of the debt
must be regarded as a bad debt, deductible as such or not at all.37 The
full deduction available under the loss provision s is simply not avail-
able. A taxpayer may not deduct as a bad debt what in truth is a loss,
and vice versa 9
As was noted earlier, worthlessness, as a prerequisite to deductibil-
ity, presents problems of proof. The possible difficulties to be encoun-
tered where a settlement with the debtor is effected should be obvious.
An early ruling" allows a deduction if the debtor lacks assets from
341d. at 943.
35 The possibility of such transition might be argued from the language of
section 1001 which speaks of "the sale or other disposition" of an asset in
the computation of gain or loss.36 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
3 Putnamn v. Comm., 352 U.S. 82 (1956); Maurice Levy, 46 B.T.A. 423 (1942),
aff'd, 131 F. 2d 544 (2d Cir. 1942); Edmund Thomas Gulledge, 57,029 P-H
Memo TC, and Ben Soni, 58,030 P-H Memo TC.
38 Sec. 165.
39 Katherine J. Hanes, 2 T.C. 213 (1943).40O.D. 297, 1919 Cum. Bull. 126.
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which the entire amount could be collected. However, a valid debt is
not ascertained to be worthless where the creditor, for consideration
satisfactory, to himself, voluntarily releases a solvent debtor from lia-
bility. 4
1
An interesting result seems possible where the cancelled part of the
debt is not actually worthless. In theory, an ordinary loss deduction is
allowable. Not being actually worthless, there is no bad debt and the
mutual exclusiveness doctrine of the Spring City case 42 is not operative.
The capital loss restrictions 43 are not imposed because the compromise
does not constitute a sale or exchange of a capital asset 44 which would
bring the case under the provisions of section 165 (f).
In Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc. 45 it was said that the voluntary
cancellation or forgiveness of indebtedness does not give rise to a
deductible loss. Obviously this is too broad a statement of the rule for
a recent ruling48 held that the discount given upon the settlement of a
purchase-money mortgage before maturity was deductible as an ordi-
nary loss, even though the debtor was fully able to pay the entire debt
and there was no decrease in the value of the mortgaged property.
An ordinary loss was allowed in Alexander County National Bank41
where notes of a financially embarrassed debtor were cancelled in the
hope that by so doing the debtor corporation, under a new management
that was agreed upon, would be able to pay the remainder of the in-
debtedness in full. The Board of Tax Appeals reached a similar result
in First National Bank of Durant, Okla.,48 holding that a cancelled debt
was allowable as a loss where it appeared that the cancellation was
made in consideration of the giving of security for other debts previ-
ously unsecured.
Nevertheless, in practice, it is many times difficult to justify the loss
deduction. A creditor who claims a loss deduction for the amount by
which he reduces the debt is frequently met with the contention that the
forgiveness was a gift or capital contribution; and a taxpayer who
compromised the amount rightfully due him on an interest bearing
41 American Felt Co. v. Burnet, 58 F. 2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1932) and Estate of Nath-
aniel King, 41,216 P-H Memo B.T.A., aff'd, 122 F. 2d 934 (3rd Cir. 1941). For
cases allowing a bad debt deduction for the difference between the face
amount of the loan and the amount received in compromise where the debtor
was unable to make payment in full, see: Arthur W. Harrison, 141,584 P-H
Memo B.T.A.; George A. Adam, f44,220 P-H Memo TC, and Annie B. Smith,
53,046 P-H Memo TC.
42 Supra note 36.
43 §§1211 and 1212.
4 Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. 2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; but settlement with a cor-
porate debtor is subject to §1232(a) (1). See McClain v. Comm., 311 U.S.
527 (1941).
4527 B.T.A. 585 (1933), aff'd, 69 F. 2d 151 (8th Cir. 1934).
46I.T. 4018, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 20.
4812 B.T.A. 1238 (1928).48 6 B.T.A. 545 (1927).
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note in order to save the time and expense of litigation was denied a
loss deduction in Nicholas D'Alonzo.49
One other question in this area requires consideration. Is the obli-
gation which is the subject of the settlement with the debtor a worth-
less bad debt within the meaning of section 166(d) or only partially
worthless and therefore not deductible? Conceivably it could be argued
that, the debtor having paid a portion of the amount owing, the debt is
now only partially worthless. There appears to he no discussion of
this point in the cases. In the light of the Annie B. Smith case 0 which
allowed the deduction in these circumstances it seems that the code
must refer to the situation where the debt is still in existence and the
taxpayer seeks a deduction for partial worthlessness, and not where
the obligation has been extinguished by a settlement.
GUARANTORS, ENDORSERS, AND INDEMNITORS
Whatever confusion may have existed following the decisions in
cases such as Pollak v. Commissioner,51 it is now settled that an en-
dorser or guarantor who is required to pay the debt of his principal
under a contract of suretyship may take a bad debt deduction but will
not be allowed a loss from the transaction.u Prior to Putnam v. Com-
missioner,3 a number of circuit courts of appeal had allowed taxpayers
full deductions for payments made as guarantors on the basis that they
were losses incurred in transactions entered into for profit though not
connected with trade or business. 54 In the Putnam case, the petitioner,
a lawyer, in a business venture not connected with his law practice,
organized a corporation, supplied its capital, and financed its operations
through advances and guarantees of its debts. Later he wound up the
corporation's affairs and liquidated its assets but did not terminate its
corporate existence. Its assets were insufficient to pay its debts and
petitioner paid $9,005.00 of its debts in discharge of his obligation as
guarantor. In holding that the loss was a nonbusiness bad debt loss to
be given short-term capital loss treatment, the Supreme Court clearly
set forth the nature of a guaranty obligation:
The familiar rule is that, instanter upon the payment by the
guarantor of the debt, the debtor's obligation to the creditor
becomes an obligation to the guarantor, not a new debt, but, by
subrogation, the result of the shift of the original debt from
the creditor to the guarantor who steps into the creditor's shoes.
Thus, the loss sustained by the guarantor unable to recover
49 51,251, P-H Memo TC.
50 Supra note 41.
51209 F. 2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1953).
52 Putnam v. Comm., 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
3 Ibid.54 Pollak v. Comm., supra note 53; Fox v. Comm., 190 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951);
Edwards v. Alien, 216 F. 2d 794 (5th Cir. 1954); Ansley v. Comm., 217 F. 2d
252 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Cudlip v. Comm., 220 F. 2d 565 (6th Cir. 1955).
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from the debtor is by its very nature a loss from the worthless-
ness of a debt.55
Thus, the deduction is allowed, not because of the payment, but
because the payment gives rise to a claim which, if it is worthless, con-
stitutes a bad debt. The status of this obligation between debtor and
guarantor, as regards existence and collectability, determines when and
if a deduction is allowable.
As also pointed out in the Putnam case, if the debt is a nonbusiness
debt as defined in section 166(d), 5c the loss is treated as a short-term
capital loss rather than an ordinary deduction from gross income. The
additional provisions of that section and the regulations covering partial
worthlessness are also applicable.
A recent example of the treatment accorded losses arising from the
guarantee of corporate obligations is found in the case of Aubrey
Campbell.5 7 There, the taxpayer-petitioner was long associated with
his father in a construction business, first as a sole proprietorship
owned by the father, later as a corporation, of which petitioner held
90 shares of stock and was secretary-treasurer. In 1953, petitioner pro-
moted a second construction enterprise, held 240 shares of the corporate
stock and was president from 1953 through 1956. He guaranteed the
payment of notes and open account of this corporation, and in 1956
paid a total of $33,207.39 on these obligations. In July of 1955, peti-
tioner purchased one-third of the capital stock of a coal mining com-
pany and became secretary of that company. These were the only
companies in whose affairs petitioner actively participated during the
year 1956. In his return for that year the amount paid as guarantor of
the corporate obligations was claimed as a business bad debt. The Com-
missioner assessed a deficiency allowing only a nonbusiness bad debt.
Petitioner contended (1) he was engaged in the business of promoting
enterprises and therefore was entitled to a deduction as a business bad
debt; and (2) that the loss was incurred in a "transaction entered into
for profit" and was deductible under section 165(c) (2).
In striking down both of these contentions, the Tax Court held that
petitioner's activities with respect to these enterprises was not "so
extensive as to qualify as the exceptional situation of being in the trade
or business of promoting, managing, and financing corporations," and
there has been no showing of any proximate relationship between the
claimed bad debt and any trade or business in which he was engaged;
and that petitioner was squarely foreclosed from claiming a deduction
under the loss section by the doctrine of Putnam v. Commissioner.5"
55 Supra, note 52 at 85.
56 The Putnam case actually involved section 23 (k) (4) of the 1939 code and the
definition of a nonbusiness bad debt has since been changed somewhat.
5 160,039 P-H Memo TC.
58 Supra note 52.
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COMMENTS
It is important in this area to distinguish between a contract of
guaranty and one of indemnity. While the object of both may be the
same, to save the promisee from loss, the legal effect is different. One
guarantees the performance of an obligation according to its terms. A
nonperformance of the obligation constitutes a breach of the guaranty
agreement giving rise to the liability of the guarantor. The other
indemnifies against loss in case of nonperformance, the failure to per-
form does not create the liability, and there is no liability until the
ascertainment of a loss therefrom. It appears that the indemnitor, in
order to obtain a deduction, usually must show a loss under section
165 (a). 59
GUARANTY OF CERTAIN NONCORPORATE OBLIGATIONS
The 1954 Code carved out an exception to the general rules appli-
cable to guarantors by section 166(f). 60 Under this provision, a tax-
payer, other than a corporation, is entitled to a full deduction for a
loss through payment of all or part of his obligation as a guarantor,
endorser, or indemnitor of a noncorporate obligation if he can show
(1) that the proceeds of the loan were used in the trade or business of
the borrower; and (2) that the obligation was worthless at the time
payment was made. In determining whether the obligation of the
borrower was worthless at that time, the taxpayer's guaranty, endorse-
ment, or indemnity is, of course, disregarded.
This rule applies not only to persons having collateral obligations
as guarantors or endorsers, but also to the persons having direct obliga-
tions as indemnitors, and also whether the debt, as between borrower
and guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor, is business or nonbusiness.
Of importance is the factor that the code section is concerned only
with the worthlessness of the original debt, and does not touch on the
worthlessness of the claim that the guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor
has against the principal debtor. The taxpayer need not show that his
"right over" is worthless.
In the great majority of the cases it is no doubt true that the
subrogee stands in no better position than the original creditor. Never-
theless, situations could exist where a guarantor's claim has value al-
though the original creditor's claim against the principal debtor is
59 Supra note 25.
60 "SEc. 166. BAD DEBTs.
"(f) Guarantor of Certain Noncorporate Obligations.-A payment by
the taxpayer (other than a corporation) in discharge of part or all of his
obligation as a guarantor, endorser, or indemnitor of a noncorporate obliga-
tion the proceeds of which were used in the trade or business of the borrower
shall be treated as a debt becoming worthless within such taxable year for
purposes of this section (except that subsection (d) shall not apply), but
only if the obligation of the borrower to the person to whom such payment
was made was worthless (without regard to such guaranty, endorsement, or
indemnity) at the time of such payment."
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worthless. As, for example, where the debtor has indicated that he will
rely on the statute of limitations as a defense if sued by the creditor,
but not if sued by the guarantor. It would appear that more equitable
results would be attained if dual worthlessness were required in all
cases.
FRANK C. DE GuIRE
